Federal Estate and State Inheritance Tax Aspects of the Family Allowance, the Homestead, and the in Lieu of Homestead Awards by Berg, Donna
Washington Law Review 
Volume 37 Number 3 
9-1-1962 
Federal Estate and State Inheritance Tax Aspects of the Family 
Allowance, the Homestead, and the in Lieu of Homestead Awards 
Donna Berg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donna Berg, Comment, Federal Estate and State Inheritance Tax Aspects of the Family Allowance, the 
Homestead, and the in Lieu of Homestead Awards, 37 Wash. L. Rev. 435 (1962). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol37/iss3/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
COMMENT
FEDERAL ESTATE AND STATE INHERITANCE TAX
ASPECTS OF THE FAMILY ALLOWANCE,
THE HOMESTEAD, AND THE
IN LIEU OF HOMESTEAD AWARDS
Petitions for setting aside the homestead or for an award in lieu of
homestead are relatively common, and the family allowance is often
requested. The availability of family support payments' as deductions
from the decedent's estate for federal estate and state inheritance tax
purposes will be considered in this Comment. Their deductibility vel
non for Washington State Inheritance Tax purposes is reasonably clear.
For Federal Estate Tax purposes, it appears that the homestead or in
lieu of homestead award does qualify, but that the family allowance
does not qualify, for the marital deduction.
WASHINGTON STATUTORY PROVIsIONs FOR SUPPORT
Under Washington statutes the surviving spouse (widow or widower)
may petition to set aside the homestead or for an award in lieu of
homestead.2 In either case the value of the property awarded cannot
exceed $6,000.00.1 These awards will normally consist of the home
and furniture.' The surviving spouse has an absolute statutory right
to one of these alternative awards on a showing of the statutory condi-
tions, the existence of which are determinable as a matter of law.5
When awarded, the property vests in the spouse absolutely and is no
longer subject to administration.'
The spouse may also petition the court for a further allowance in
the form of cash for maintenance of the family during administration
of the estate.! Unlike the award of homestead or the award in lieu of
homestead, granting the family allowance is discretionary with the
I RCW 11.52.
2 RCW 11.52.010-.020.
3 Ibid.
4In re Jones' Estate, 11 Wn2d 254, 118 P2d 951 (1941).
5 In re Cooper's Estate, 32 Wn2d 444, 202 P.2d 439 (1949) ; In re Wind's Estate, 32
Wn.2d 64, 200 P2d 748 (1948) ; In re Small's Estate, 27 Wn.2d 677, 179 P.2d 505(1947) ; In re Poli's Estate, 27 Wn2d 670, 179 P2d 704 (1947) ; In re Welch's Estate,
200 Wash. 686, 94 P.2d 758 (1939) ; In re Andrews' Estate, 123 Wash. 546, 212 Pac.
1073 (1923).
G Ibid.; RCW 11.52.010-.020.
7 RCW 11.52.040.
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probate court,8 and the allowance is subject to court modification as
the needs of the family change.'
STATE INiERiTAwCE TAX ASPECTS
OF FAmLy SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Washington inheritance tax statutes permit the estate to deduct up
to $1,000.00 for court-ordered family allowance payments. 0 The
deduction was allowed in In re Ferrel's Estate," even though a non-
intervention will made no provision for an allowance and the executor
paid it from estate assets without court order but later obtained court
approval.
In the Ferrel case the court appears to have assumed that the full
$1,000.00 deduction was available to the estate without regard to
whether the family allowance was a community or separate obligation
and without regard to whether, if community, it exceeded $2,000.00 so
as to make the decedent's share of the liability $1,000.00. The court
made no mention of the issue. The briefs submitted in the case show
that the total estate was community property and that the surviving
spouses received an allowance "in excess" of $1,000.00.1 How much
in excess was not stated. It seems arguable that the full $1,000.00
deduction is available so long as $1,000.00 is paid, even if the estate
consists solely of community property. Clearly the full $1,000.00
deduction is available, no matter to whom paid or from what property
paid, provided the allowance is at least $2,000.00.
No state inheritance tax deduction is allowed the decedent's estate
for the transfer of the homestead or payment of the award in lieu of
homestead. 3 After outlining the property subject to the state inheri-
8 In re Wind's Estate, 32 Wn2d 64, 200 P.2d 748 (1948).
9 In re Armstrong's Estate, 33 Wn2d 118, 204 P.2d 500 (1949) ; In re Hilleware's
Estate, 159 Wash. 580, 294 Pac. 230 (1930).
10 RCW 83.04.010.
11112 Wash. 231, 192 Pac. 10 (1920).1 2 Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-6, In re Ferrel's Estate, 112 Wash. 231, 192 Pac. 10
(1920).
Is RCW 83.08.020 appears to give preferential treatment to recipients of family sup-
port payments. Ordinarily all Class A beneficiaries benefit from the total exemptions
given their class by RCW 83.08.020, because RCW 83.08.060 provides that the taxes
imposed and the exemption with respect to each class of beneficiaries shall be appor-
tioned between the beneficiaries in such class in proportion to the amount receivable by
such beneficiary. However, RCW 83.08.020, after providing that the exemptions shall
be allowed to the class as a whole and not to the persons therein, states: "which exemp-
tions shall include all allowances in lieu of homestead and all family allowances in
excess of one thousand dollars." Since the exemptions "include" the award in lieu of
homestead and the excess family allowance, this provision clearly does not grant an
added exemption to the class. Rather, it suggests that although the total exemption and
the total tax will be prorated among those in the class, the excess family allowance and
the award in lieu of homestead will not be treated as received by those who did receive
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tance tax, RCW 83.04.010 provides that the property "shall, for the
use of the state, be subject to a tax... measured by the full value of
the entire property after deduction of the amounts allowable under
RCW 83.04.013." The deductions allowable under RCW 83.04.013
are:
all debts owing by the decedent at the time of his death, the local and
state taxes due from the estate prior to his death, and a reasonable sum
for funeral expenses, monument or crypt, court costs, including cost of
appraisement made for the purpose of assessing the inheritance tax,
the fees of executors, administrators or trustees, reasonable attorney's
fees, and family allowance not to exceed one thousand dollars, and no
other sum .... (Emphasis added.)
FEDERAL ESTATE TAx ASPECTS OF FAMImy SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Provisions for family support upon the death of one spouse vary
from state to state. Some of the cases subsequently cited involve
lump sum payments while others involve monthly payments or setting
aside property once claimed as exempt. Some deal with "an allowance
for support" and others with "setting aside exempt property." The
tests of deductibility appear to be the same for both and the cases do
not appear to turn on the label attached to the award. Consequently
the award in lieu of homestead may be treated either as a setting aside
of exempt property or as a family allowance. It has some of the char-
acteristics of each. Basic to all of the cited cases is a payment of some
sort to the surviving spouse from the estate of the decedent spouse
under a statutory provision.
When the marital deduction section was originally enacted, the
treatment of statutory support payments as a marital deduction was
not contemplated 4 because at that time they were specifically deducti-
ble from the decendent's gross estate under 812(b) (5) of the Int.
Rev. Code of 1939. Section 812(b)(5) was subsequently repealed,
however, because it discriminated in favor of estates located in juris-
dictions with liberal support allowances. 5 The Senate Report which
accompanied the repeal stated that thereafter such expenditures would
be allowable as marital deductions, subject to the terminable interest
it for purposes of computing their share of the tax. For example, inheritance tax will be
levied on the homestead awarded to the disinherited wife, but other beneficiaries will
pay the tax. Since the surviving spouse is the only one who can receive the award in
lieu of homestead and is one of those primarily benefited by the family allowance, the
effect of this statutory provision appears to be of special advantage to her.
14 Estate of Cunha v. Comm'r, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960).
25 Ibid.
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limitations. 6 The Congress appears to have felt it unfair to allow
unlimited deductions for support provisions-thus inviting states to
enact extravagant support provisions-but that an allowance paid to
the surviving spouse is an interest in property passing from the de-
cedent's estate and should be deductible, subject to the same limita-
tions as other interests so passing.
This view has been adopted in Revenue Rulings 83"' and 55-419,8
and in subsequent cases, although it has been questioned whether
statutory allowances are interests which pass from the decedent's
estate. 9 The case law indicates that the Washington family allowance
is a terminable interest and does not qualify for the marital deduction.
However, the homestead and in lieu of homestead awards appear not
to be terminable interests and to qualify for the marital deduction."0
The current Estate Tax Regulations, 20.2056(b)-l(b), state: "A
16 Ibid.
17 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 395.
18 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 458.
'9 Estate of Rensenhouse, 27 T.C. 107 was remanded in 252 F2d 566 (6th Cir. 1958)
because the Tax Court had concluded that the widow's allowance was not an interest
"in property passing from decedent." The Commissioner later conceded that such
allowances were interests in property passing from the decedent in Molner v. United
States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1959), and Estate of Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960). See
also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(a) ; 5 MERTENS, FEDnA G=rT & ESTATE TAXATION
83 Supp. 1961).
20 Six conditions must be met for a marital deduction: (1) A decedent dying after
December 31, 1947 (when § 2056 became effective) ; (2) A citizen or resident of the
United States at the time of death; (3) Marriage and survival by a spouse; (4) An
interest in property which passed from decedent to the surviving spouse; (5) Which
was included in decedent's gross estate; and (6) Which is not a terminable, non-
deductible interest. LowNDENs & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE & Gi'Fr TAXES 379 (1956).
The homestead or in lieu of homestead award and the family allowance clearly come in
whole or in part from the estate of the decedent spouse. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b)
states: "Property subject to homestead or other exemptions under local law is included
in the gross estate." Property or money from which the in lieu of homestead and the
family allowance is taken is included in the gross estate pursuant to § 2033: "The value
of the gross estate shall include the value of all property.., to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
Since family support payments can qualify as deductions only by qualifying for the
marital deduction under § 2056 of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954, their utility in community
property states is subject to the following limitations: it will have no utility where the
estate is all community or where the marital deduction has been used up by the transfer
of other property; and the deduction is limited to one-half where the award is made
from community property.
The value of the interest in property passing to the surviving spouse from the de-
cedent's estate qualifies for the marital deduction unless: (1) the interest is terminable,
and (2) on termination of the interest someone else may enjoy any part of the property
by reason of an interest which he has received from decedent for less than full considera-
tion in money's worth. (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) ). Most litigation concerning
family support payments centers on whether the interest received by the surviving
spouse is terminable. Where the surviving spouse is also residuary taker by will or
intestacy, an award of family support payments will qualify for the marital deduction
even if the spouse's right to payments thereunder will terminate on some contingency,
because on termination of the interest, she will continue to enjoy the property. Though
the allowance is a "terminable" interest in the estate assets, it is not a "terminable
non-deductible" interest. (Rev. Rul. 56-26, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 447).
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'terminable interest' in property is an interest which will terminate or
fail on the lapse of time or on the occurrence or the failure to occur of
some contingency." Conceivably, a surviving spouse's interest in
property received from the decedent's estate could be tested for
terminability as of three different points in time: (1) The time of the
decedent's death; (2) the time that the allowance is awarded; or (3)
the time that the actual payments are made pursuant to the award.
The propriety of testing for terminability as of these various points
in time will be discussed in light of the existing Revenue Rulings
and case law.
Revenue Ruling 83 and subsequent cases have clearly indicated
that the time at which the payments are actually made is not the
proper time to consider whether the spouse has a terminable interest in
the estate assets. If it were, any payments actually made to the surviv-
ing spouse would qualify, even though the right to future payments
under the award would terminate upon death or remarriage. Revenue
Ruling 83 states:
In many States local courts have held that such allowances, or any
rights thereto, terminate ipso facto upon remarriage and that death also
terminates any rights to subsequent allowances. Under such circum-
stances, the interests passing to the surviving spouses of decedents in
the forms of allowances made for their support, pursuant to local law,
amount to no more than annuities payable out of the assets of the estates
during the periods of settlement or until prior death or remarriage of
the surviving spouses and, as such, constitute terminable interests .... 21
In 1959 the Federal District Court in Nebraska, in Quivley v.
United States,22 held that the proper time as of which to view the
terminable nature of the interest in property passing to the spouse was
the time at which sums were actually paid to the widow pursuant to
the award. Under Nebraska law, the allowance of $2,000.00 per month
for 12 months which had been granted the widow would terminate if
she died during the period of administration. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, and found
that the interest granted to the widow was terminable because the
right to further payments under the award would terminate if she died
or remarried." Thus it seems that the nature of the interest passing
to the surviving spouse should be determined either as of the time of
21 1953-1 Cum. BuLL. 395.
22 176 F. Supp. 433 (D. Neb. 1959).
2BUnited States v. Quivey, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961).
19621
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decedent's death or as of the time that the allowance is awarded to
the surviving spouse.
In Quivley the court of appeal stated that the situation is to be
viewed as of the time of decedent's death." It cited earlier cases in
which the statement was first made, apparently approving their
results. However, all cases in which this statement has been made have
in fact held2" or cited with approval the holding 6 that the allowance
is not a terminable interest and qualifies for the marital deduction in
situations where the surviving spouse had a vested statutory right to
the allowance and has in fact exercised the right and obtained the
award. One case27 has held that the allowance qualified where the pro-
bate court had discretion to grant or deny the allowance but in fact
had granted it, while in another, 8 qualification was denied on these
facts. Those cases which have held that the family allowance passing
pursuant to a vested statutory right (not discretionary with the probate
court) is not a terminable interest and qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion, have done so on the theory that although the surviving spouse
must petition the court to enforce the vested right to the allowance,
the mere requirement that one resort to the law to enforce a vested
right is not such a contingency as was contemplated to make the
interest terminable.2"
It seems that although the situation is purportedly viewed as of the
decedent's death in these cases, they may be rationalized more accur-
ately as a view of the situation as of the time when the award of the
allowance is made. The interest in the estate assets in the form of the
allowance is confused with the statutory right to claim the allowance.
The "interest in property" which passes to the surviving spouse within
the meaning of the marital deduction provision is not the statutory
right to claim the allowance, but the allowance itself, once granted."
If the situation is truly to be viewed as of the decedent's death, the
surviving spouse could never have an interest in the estate assets, in
the form of an allowance for support, which would qualify for the
marital deduction. At the time of death the survivor cannot possibly
24 Id. at 255.
25 Reynolds' Estate v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Mich. 1960) ; Molner v.
United States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Il. 1959) ; Estate of Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818
(1959).
26 Estate of Cunha v. Comm'r, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960) ; United States Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore. 1960).
27 Estate of Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960).
2 8 United States Nat'l Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore. 1960).
29 Cases cited note 25 supra.
80 Estate of Cunha v. Comm'r, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960).
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have an interest in the estate assets. Even where the spouse has a
vested statutory right to claim the allowance, which right the probate
court cannot deny, a petition must be made before a property right in
the estate assets can exist. All that exists at decedent's death is a sta-
tutory right to claim the award. This is not an interest in "property"
passing from the decedent.31 To allow a sum to qualify for the marital
deduction solely because at the moment of death the spouse had a
vested statutory right to claim the award would be inappropriate. The
award for which a deduction was allowed might never be claimed. The
courts have not been faced with this difficulty because in all cases the
allowance has been awarded by the time litigation arises.
Since at the time of decedent's death a spouse will never have an
interest in the estate in the form of an allowance, and since it would be
inappropriate to allow a sum to qualify for the marital deduction
simply because it might be claimed, Revenue Ruling 83 must have
been written on the assumption that an allowance had been granted
to the surviving spouse; then directed its test to whether once awarded,
the right to payments under the award was indefeasibly vested and
could be enforced by the recipient, even in the event of remarriage, or
by his estate in the event of his death. This would indicate that in
the contemplation of Revenue Ruling 83, the appropriate time for
determining whether the spouse has an interest in the estate assets
which qualifies for the marital deduction is the time at which the award
is actually made. At this time, it would not matter whether the statu-
tory right to claim the award was vested or subject to the discretion of
the probate court. The determinative factor would be whether, once
the award was granted, the right to all payments thereunder was inde-
feasibly vested in the surviving spouse. Revenue Ruling 83 states:
[I]t is held that the interest in an estate which passes to a surviving
spouse pursuant to State law in the form of an allowance for support
during the period of settlement of the deceased spouse's estate must
constitute a vested right of property such as will, in the event of her
death as of any moment or time following the decedent's death, survive
as an asset of her estate, in order to qualify under section 812(e) (1)
(A) [now section 2056(a)] of the Internal Revenue Code for the
estate tax marital deduction. (Emphasis added.)
The ruling does not provide that the situation must be viewed as of
time of decedent's death. It provides that to qualify, the allowance
must be one that will survive as an asset of the surviving spouse's
81 Ibid.
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estate in the event of her death at any time after the decedent's death.
It does not provide that as of his death such allowance must have been
awarded. The "interest in the estate" passes in the form of an allow-
ance "pursuant to State law." The right under state law is not itself
the "interest which passes." Hence it is immaterial whether the right
under state law will "terminate or fail on the lapse of time or on the
occurence or the failure to occur of some contingency." Certainly if a
spouse in Washington does not petition for an award in lieu of home-
stead it will be lost." After six years the statutory right will lapse.
However, it is not an interest in the property of the decedent's estate
which lapses. The survivor simply receives no interest in the decedent's
estate. The failure to distinguish between the statutory right to obtain
the allowance and the right to payments pursuant to an award of the
allowance has led to much confusion.
In King v. Wiseman", the court interpreted the Ruling to require
that the statutory right to claim the allowance be vested. It went to
great lengths to point out that even though the Oklahoma statute under
which the support allowance was granted read, "may in its discretion
make such reasonable allowance,"'" it held that the $1,250.00 per
month allowance which had been granted to the spouse, pending settle-
ment of the estate, was not a terminable interest and hence qualified
for the marital deduction. The court concluded: "[U] nder the Okla-
homa Statutes the allowance given to a widow when approved and
authorized by the Probate Court vests in the widow an absolute inde-
feasible right to said allowance and ...it should all be included in
the marital deduction." (Emphasis added.)3"
Estate of Nelson v. Comm'r 8 quite reasonably held that homestead
property awarded the widow did not qualify for the marital deduction
where, under Florida law, her interest in the property, even after the
homestead was awarded to her, would terminate upon her death, and
the property would pass to her children without inclusion in her gross
estate.
In Estate of Rensenhouse,3 7 the argument was made that a court-
ordered $10,000.00 lump sum allowance, paid to the widow for support
pursuant to Michigan law, was a terminable interest because a petition
of the widow was a prerequisite to granting the allowance. This
32 Francon v. Cox, 38 Wn2d 530, 231 P2d 265 (1951) ; RCW 11.52.010.
3s 147 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Okla. 1956).
34 Id. at 157.
35 Id. at 156.8 232 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1956).
37 31 T.C 818 (1959).
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appears to be the earliest decision in which the statement that the
situation must be viewed as of the time of the decedent's death was
made. The court seems to have confused the nature of the statutory
right with the interest in estate assets passing pursuant to the award.
It reached what seems to be the correct result, however, in concluding
that the necessity of a petition to enforce the statutory right did not
preclude its being vested:
As of decedent's death his widow was entitled to a widow's allowance
for I year and her right to this allowance was not lost by reason of her
subsequent death or remarriage. . . . Of course the widow (or her
representative) had to ask for the enforcement of this right or interest
by petition to the appropriate Probate Court, and the Probate Court
by its order would render the right enforcible. However, we are unable
to agree with respondent that the necessity of involdng the proper legal
procedures for the enforcement of a right is a contingency to the
existence of the right (i.e., a "failure of an event or contingency to
occur" upon which the "interest passing to the surviving spouse will
. . . fail") within the meaning of the statute.38
The court reasoned that invoking proper legal proceedings is
required with regard to most widows' allowances and if this were a
relevant factor it would almost universally deny the marital deduction
for support allowances. It said that this was not considered a relevant
factor in Revenue Ruling 83 and that it did not believe that Congress
had intended it to be of legal significance. In this the court was prob-
ably correct. If it had recognized that the interest in estate assets
passing to the spouse is the allowance once awarded, not the statutory
right to claim the allowance, and that the Commissioner must have in-
tended to view the situation as of the time that the allowance is award-
ed, it would not have stated that the time for viewing the situation is the
time of decedent's death, and a good deal of current confusion would
have been obviated.
Molner v. United States39 followed Rensenhouse in holding that
although the right to the allowance might be subject to some court
action, it is a "vested right." Citing Rensenhouse with approval, it up-
held, as not terminable and thus qualifying for the marital deduction, a
$25,000 award to be paid in installments for the widow's support. The
Commissioner argued that the interest was terminable because under
a 1907 Illinois act, the probate court was given power, upon a petition
being made, to increase or diminish the award originally granted by
8Id. at 821.
39175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. IM. 1959).
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the appraisers. The court said that the probate court had always had
inherent power to review the award and send it back to the appraisers.
The fact that the award was allowed by appraisers, subject to review
by the court, instead of being allowed by the court in the first instance
upon filing of a petition, as in Michigan, was considered "a mere dif-
ference in the legal procedure"4 and not a relevant fact in considering
whether the interest is terminable.
In cases in which state law provides that the probate court cannot
refuse to grant the allowance on petition for it, what appears to be
the correct result is reached by following the apparently fallacious
Rensenkouse reasoning. Where, however, the statutory provision per-
mits the probate court to exercise its discretion in granting the allow-
ance, incorrect results appear to occur. In United States Natl Bank
v. United States,41 the Oregon Federal District Court denied that a
$12,000.00 lump sum allowance for support, which had in fact been
paid to the widow, qualified for the marital deduction. The court held
that only a terminable interest passed to the surviving spouse because
under Oregon law the receipt and size of the allowance was contingent
on many factors-the widow's circumstances, her health, necessary
expenditures for her support, income derived from her own property,
her other income, and the total amount of estate assets-all considered
by the probate court in the exercise of its discretion in granting or
refusing the allowance.
The court recognized that at the time of decedent's death the surviv-
ing spouse had no interest in the estate assets themselves but rather
only a statutory privilege, exercisable at her whim, to claim the
allowance. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Estate of
Cunka v. Comm'r,;2 had recently stated (in dicta so far as the termin-
able nature of the interest was concerned) that the situation is to be
viewed as of the time of decedent's death. The Oregon Federal District
Court felt bound to conclude that the spouse's interest in the estate
assets, not having existed at the moment of decedent's death, did not
qualify for the marital deduction. Thus a rule originating in confusion,
not even applied literally in the case which first announced it,43 and
long stated without recognition of what its literal application would
mean, was here applied to disqualify an allowance which, within the
strict meaning of Revenue Ruling 83, would seem to qualify for the
40 Id. at 281.
41 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore. 1960).
42 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960) : see also Parker v. United States, CCH Tax Ct.
Mer. 12062 (1962).43Estate of Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818 (1959).
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marital deduction. Even then no end was put to the confusion, for
the court cited with apparent approval the King, Rensenkouse, and
Molner cases. It attempted to distinguish them:
It would appear that the state law in each of the states in which those
cases arose held that the widow's support statute created a vested
interest which she would receive in any event. In other words, the
property right was created in the assets of the estate and the courts
of those states had so held."
Yet these cases do not appear to hold that the state law itself gave
the interest in the estate assets. Rensenkouse and Molner specifically
discussed the fact that the surviving spouse had to petition the court
in order to enforce the right and obtain the assets of the estate, while
King assumed this fact. Certainly the statutory rights in those cases
were vested, while in Oregon granting the allowance was within the
discretion of the probate court. But this seems to be an irrelevant
distinction if terminability is determined as of the time that the award
is made by the probate court.
It is unpredictable whether the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit will clarify the terminable interest rules. It took the first step in
Estate of Cunha v. Comm'r by recognizing that the property interest
involved is not the statutory right to claim the allowance, but the inter-
est in estate assets themselves. The executor had admitted that the
spouse's interest was terminable because all right to future payments,
even after the award was made, would terminate upon her death or
remarriage. He argued that it was not a non-deductible, terminable
interest, because the "property" in which the widow had an interest
was her statutory "right" to claim the allowance, and since this "right"
disappeared at the same time her interest terminated, no one else could
enjoy the "property." The court held that "property" within the
meaning of the marital deduction provisions meant the assets of the
decedent's estate. Since the widow's interest in the assets of the estate
by way of the allowance would terminate upon her later death or
remarriage, it was a non-deductible, terminable interest, and did not
qualify for the marital deduction. 5
In looking to the meaning of the word "property," the court viewed
the situation as of the time of decedent's death and found that the
widow then had only a right to apply for an allowance. Further, the
amount of the allowance was in the discretion of the probate court.
41 188 F. Supp. 332, 338 (D. Ore. 1960).
45 See note 20 supra.
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Yet, all of this was to determine whether the admittedly terminable
interest was also a non-deductible, terminable interest.46 In the early
pages of the opinion47 the court said that the interest was terminable
simply because the right to the allowance terminated upon the widow's
death or remarriage. As far as the issue of terminability goes, the
statement that the situation should be viewed as of the date of dece-
dent's death is dictum. More significantly, the court apparently
approved the results of the King, Rensenhouse and Molner cases:
[T]he Commissioner conceded that a widow's allowance was an inter-
est in property which passed to the widow within the meaning of the
marital deduction provision and would qualify for the deduction if the
right to an allowance under applicable state law was vested in a
manner such that the widow or her estate would receive payments in
any event.. . Deductions of widow's allowances have been upheld
where under state law the widow's interest was so vested. See
Estate of Procter D. Rensenhouse,... King v. Wisemian,.. . Molner
v. United States.... But that is not the instant case. It is admitted
here that a widow's right to an allowance in California terminates upon
her death or remarriage. 48
It is possible that although the court recognized that as of dece-
dent's death the widow had no "property" but only a right to apply
for the allowance, it might still have found that she had an interest
which was not a non-deductible, terminable interest, which qualified
for the marital deduction if, under California law, her right to pay-
ments would not have terminated on her later death or remarriage. If
so, it would imply that the appropriate time for determining termina-
bility is the time when the allowance is awarded by the probate court.
Estate of Gale 9 seemed to adopt this reasoning in allowing a marital
deduction for a lump sum award to a widower paid pursuant to Maine
statutes. The statutes were similar to the Washington in lieu of home-
stead statute in that the statutory right was subject to two conditions
(there, solvency of the wife's estate and availability of only her per-
sonal property for the award). However, unlike the in lieu of home-
stead statute, and like the family allowance statutes in Washington and
Oregon, the amount of the award was subject to the discretion of the
probate court. Instead of saying that the widower's interest in property
was subject to "many factors" as did the federal district court in the
United States Nat'l Bank case, the court said that the state court
46 279 F2d 292 297 (9th Cir. 1960).7 Id. at 295.48 Ibid.
49 35 T.C. 215 (1960).
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had considered the various criteria, rendered its decision, and since the
single payment allowance when awarded was not recoverable in case
of the widower's later death or remarriage, it was vested absolutely and
qualified for the marital deduction.
In First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. United States," the widow
received $59,604.29 in bonds for her support under a Georgia statute
which provided that her right to claim the award would terminate if
she died or remarried before filing application for support, but once
awarded, fee simple interest vested in her, which could not be divested
in any event. The court held that this was in the nature of a statute of
limitations and merely an adjective provision having no substantive
effect on her interest in the property passing to her after timely award.
The court said that in all the reported cases (citing those discussed
herein), there had been at least an implied acknowledgement that the
widow's allowance did not become an interest in property until such
time as the court order determined the amount thereof and directed
its payment or delivery. Under these circumstances the terminable
interest rule should be applied to events that might occur after the
order was entered: "[W]e must examine the widow's interest at the
time that interest arose to determine whether it is terminable, and that
is at the time the probate court entered its order granting the
allowance."'
The final development in this area is the 1961 case of United States
v. Quivey," decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
which the district court's determination that the time for testing the
terminability of the interest was when the actual payments were made
pursuant to the award, was reversed. Again the rule is stated that the
situation must be viewed as of the time of decedent's death. Yet, again
in apparent approval, not only King, Rensenhouse, Molner and Cunha,
but also Estate of Gale and First Nat'l Bank and Trust are cited. The
court, citing the above cases, said that all of the reported cases in which
the question was considered, recognized "that only where a state statute
does not leave a widow's allowance thus subject to termination, can
the interest in the decedent's estate which it represents qualify as a
marital deduction under section 2056.2"1 (Emphasis added.) In this
case the widow's right to monthly payments after the award was made'
would terminate if she died or remarried.
S0191 F. Supp. 446 (S.D. Ga. 1960).
1lId. at 448.
52 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961).
53 Id. at 255.
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CONCLUSION
There are three possible conclusions to which the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit might come concerning the Washington family
support provisions: (1) The court might follow the theory of Rensen-
house and others that qualification for the marital deduction depends
upon whether the statutory right to claim the award is vested. In this
event the homestead or in lieu of homestead awards would qualify for
the marital deduction but the family allowance would not. Statutes"
and cases5 unequivocally indicate that the right to the former is a
vested right, such that on meeting the statutory requirements (deter-
minable as a matter of law), the right to the homestead or in lieu of
homestead award cannot be denied by the probate court. Equally
clearly, granting the family allowance is within the discretion of the
probate court,5" and under the reasoning of United States Natl Bank
v. United States (decided by an Oregon Federal District Court) would
not qualify for the marital deduction. (2) The court has recognized
that the interest in property which is determinative is not the statutory
right to claim the award but the interest in estate assets acquired
pursuant to the award.5" It might look no further and simply apply
the apparently fallacious rule that the situation is to be viewed as of
the moment of decedent's death. In this event it would hold that since
at the moment of death, neither the homestead or in lieu of homestead
award, nor the family allowance, as interests in estate assets, have
vested in the surviving spouse, neither qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion. This would make Revenue Rulings 83 and 55-41958 nullities for
all practical purposes. It appears an unlikely result, however, in view
of the fact that the King, Rensenhouse and Molner cases were cited
with apparent approval in Estate of Cunha v. Comm'r. (3) The
court might recognize that since the interest in property, correctly
viewed, is the interest in the estate assets, no award obtainable only by
petition can possibly qualify for the marital deduction if the situation
is viewed as of the time of decedent's death. In this event it seems
that the court would hold that the critical moment at which to view
terminability of the interest in the estate assets is when the award is
granted. Again, the homestead or the in lieu of homestead award
would qualify for the marital deduction but the family allowance
54 RCW 11.52.010-.020.55 See note 5 supra.
56 See note 8 supra.
5T Estate of Cunha v. Comnm'r, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960).58 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 458.
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would not. The award of the homestead or the in lieu of homestead
property vests an indefeasible property interest, not terminable on any
future event. 9 Payments under the family allowance, however, remain
subject to modification by the probate court as the needs of the family
change." This seems to be a contingency which would make the
interest terminable."
DONNA BERG
SO See notes 5 and 6 supra.
GO See note 9 supra.
61 But see dictum in Reynolds' Estate v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 548, 51 (E.D.
Mich. 1960) : "However, the only contingencies specifically mentioned in Rev. Rul. 83,
1953-1 Cum. Buu.. 395, are the remarriage or death of the widow.'"
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